From Devil to Louse. Milan gathers on Monday: with the money from Reijnders, Theo & Kalulu, they could have already given Allegri new reinforcements, but Furlani & Co.'s stinginess made it impossible

With Inter and Juve only reuniting at the end of July, Max could have been put in the best possible position to hit the ground running: instead, the executives only thought about their own interests

(Translated into English by Grok)

If it’s true that in football, a single point often makes all the difference (one extra point allowed Napoli to snatch the Scudetto from Inter, one extra point allowed Juventus to take a Champions League spot from Roma), if Milan’s executives, stung by the disastrous season just concluded, were even minimally conscientious and genuinely interested in the sporting fortunes of their club, after deciding to entrust the team to Massimiliano Allegri, they should have met, analyzed the current (and evolving) landscape of Italian football, and agreed on a fundamental point: due to a series of favorable circumstances, starting with Inter and Juventus’s participation in the Club World Cup in the USA, the conditions were ripe to capitalize on the handicaps these competitors will face at the start of the season and create a gap in Milan’s favor. Out of all European competitions and focused solely on the league, Milan has the chance to turn the sporting setback of missing out on Europe into a massive advantage.

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For those unaware, Milan will be the first Serie A team to gather for pre-season training. They will do so on Monday, July 7, at Milanello, six days ahead of Roma (Trigoria, July 13), seven days ahead of Lazio and Fiorentina (Formello and Bagno a Ripoli, July 14), eight days ahead of Atalanta (Zingonia, July 15), ten days ahead of Napoli (Dimaro, July 17), but, most importantly, a full month ahead of Juventus and Inter. Having participated in the Club World Cup, despite being eliminated relatively early, these two teams have only recently returned to base and have just sent their players off for mandatory vacations. Juventus players will regroup at Continassa at the end of July before heading to their training camp in Herzogenaurach—Adidas’s sports facility in Germany—on August 2. Inter’s gathering date is still to be confirmed.

Now, you don’t need to be Einstein to understand that Milan starting work a month earlier than their two historic and formidable rivals could be an invaluable advantage. And you don’t need to be Einstein to realize that, with Allegri tasked with a deep restructuring—practically a technical rebuild of the team—it would be crucial, even decisive, for him to have as many players from the new squad as possible, especially the new signings, available from the outset. This situation has been clear since May 25, the final day of the last season. So, what happened instead?

What happened is that Furlani & Co., as always, prioritized their own interests. To avoid looking bad in the eyes of the shortsighted and inept Elliott-RedBird ownership, they focused primarily on avoiding a financial loss in the balance sheet (the sporting one was already beyond saving). This allowed them to secure the bonus, or cash prize, owed to “good administrators” who keep the club out of the red. Furlani & Co. thus rushed to sell Milan’s best player, Reijnders, to Manchester City at a price significantly below his market value, causing serious damage to the club; then Theo Hernandez to Al Hilal in Saudi Arabia; and finally Kalulu, on whom Juventus exercised a pre-agreed buy option from last summer. By early June, 110 million euros had already flowed into the Rossoneri’s coffers, allowing these “heroes” to close a financially and sportingly disastrous season in the black. Next year, however, the absence of UEFA revenue will result in a loss of at least 60 million euros. But, as mentioned, the only thing Furlani & Co. truly cared about was a positive balance sheet and collecting their “good executive” bonus. Sigh!

And that’s what happened. But if, instead of thinking about their own wallets, Furlani & Co. had focused on the good and interests of AC Milan, with the 110 million euros already in the bank by early June from the sales of Reijnders, Theo, and Kalulu, the executives could have ensured that, in three days’ time, Massimiliano Allegri would have found a largely complete new squad waiting for him at Milanello. For example, if it’s true—as has been reported for some time—that Allegri is keen on players like Jashari, Retegui, and Ricci, the 110 million euros from those sales could have already been reinvested in acquiring these players: 35 million plus 5 in bonuses to Bruges for Jashari, 40 million to Atalanta for Retegui, 20 million plus 5 in bonuses to Torino for Ricci. On Monday, Allegri would have had them at his disposal at Milanello from the first training session, and things would have been very different for everyone—perhaps even with a certain Luka Modric stepping in to claim a locker in the Rossoneri’s training center dressing room.

Instead, what’s happening? What’s happening is that, with the stinginess, pedantry, and fiscal obsession that have become the hallmark of the American-owned Milan, the new sporting director Tare is conducting transfer negotiations while weighed down by the ball and chain imposed by Furlani. Despite Milan having plenty of money in the bank, negotiations to secure Bruges’s approval for Jashari are proceeding at a snail’s pace, with offers starting at 25 million plus 3 in bonuses, then, after a week, rising to 28 million plus 5 in bonuses, and after another week, reaching 30 million plus 5 in bonuses. As Celentano once sang, “meanwhile, time slips away between dreams and worries, and fishnet stockings have already replaced knee-high socks.”

Indeed: because Bruges and Jashari, annoyed by such pettiness, might grow tired and decide to ditch the bothersome Milan in favor of other suitors. And even if, in the end, the long-awaited agreement is reached with Furlani, ulcer-ridden, finally agreeing to the 35 million plus 5 in bonuses Bruges has always demanded, it will be late August, the season will have already started, and Allegri will find himself in the same situation as Chivu at Inter and Tudor at Juventus: with new signings delivered at the last minute, thrown onto the pitch without even having time to be introduced to their teammates.

The stinginess of the “American” Milan’s executives, a vice of monumental stupidity that triggers a cascade of others—from shortsightedness to incompetence, from inadequacy to foolishness—has already reduced the glorious AC Milan to the grotesque caricature it is today. But now, it’s pushing it toward ridicule. Elliott and RedBird, Singer and Cardinale, still haven’t understood that there’s no surer way to reduce Milan to poverty than behaving like misers. At this point, all that’s left for Furlani—the long arm of the ownership—is to replace the Devil logo with that of a louse: and the transformation of what AC Milan once was will be complete.